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Abstract: The Multiverse Response to the problem of evil has it that God 
made our universe because God makes every universe meeting a certain 
standard. The main problem for that response is that there’s no 
explanation for why God didn’t just keeping making duplicates of perfect 
universes. This paper introduces the ‘Multiactualities Response’, which 
says that God actualises every possible world that meets a certain 
standard of value. It avoids the corresponding problem about duplication 
because different propositions must always be true at distinct worlds. The 
Multiactualities Response nevertheless has its own problem, namely that 
it requires the possibility of multiple actual worlds. This paper argues that 
if we consider spacetimes with wormholes, we have good cause to think 
there can be multiple metaphysically privileged present moments; given 
a suitable analogy between time and modality, it follows that there can be 
multiple metaphysically privileged (i.e. actual) worlds. This paper 
includes an in–depth examination of the metaphysics of both the temporal 
and modal cases.  
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We all know the problem of evil: (i) God, were He to exist, wouldn’t allow any 
evils to unnecessarily befall people; but (ii) many unnecessary evils befall people; 
thus, (iii) there is no God. The Multiverse Response (§2) denies (ii). According to 
the response, God is obliged to create multiple universes, including both perfect 
ones and our, imperfect, universe, thus the evils which we suffer are necessary. 
But there’s a big problem for the Multiverse Response, namely the Duplication 
Objection: Why doesn’t God just make an infinite number of perfect universes 
(§3)?  
I argue that a variant theory, whereby there are multiple actual worlds (rather 
than multiple universes) solves this problem (§4). But that theory relies upon the 
bizarre idea that there can be ‘multiple actualities’. I argue that a ‘Dowian’ theory 





moments are metaphysically possible. Since there’s a strong analogy between 
actuality and presentness, I conclude that there can be multiple actual worlds (§6–
8). Thus, a theory of ‘multiple actualities’ can resolve the problem of evil. 
 
1. The Multiverse Response  
 
This section explains the Multiverse Response to the problem of evil (Forrest 
1981; Kraay 2010a; McHarry 1978; Megill 2011; Parfit 1992; Turner 2003).1  
Take a ‘universe’ to be a maximally connected spacetime.2 Imagine the best 
possible universe. I’ll assume that such a universe is perfect, containing no evil 
or imperfection. Call it ‘𝕌P’. According to the Multiverse Response, God made 𝕌P. 
God also has the ability to make more than just the one universe. Consider a 
slightly imperfect universe, 𝕌P-. 𝕌P- is exactly like 𝕌P except for a single pockmark 
of imperfection e.g. someone briefly having a cold. Were 𝕌P- to exist in addition 
to 𝕌P then scads more people would have excellent lives, marred only by a single 
person’s brief and mild illness. Since God can make 𝕌P- in addition to 𝕌P, God 
does make it—after all, it’d be churlish to think that one pockmark of minor evil 
outweighs the lives of all of the people who’d exist in 𝕌P-.  
More universes are possible. Each contains more evil again than 𝕌P-. And the 
same reasoning applies: where the evils aren’t so bad that they disqualify the 
universe from being created, God makes those universes as well. So God makes 
a whole gamut of universes! The Multiverse Response has it that this includes 
our own universe. Thus we have an explanation for why our universe contains 
the evils that it does. Moreover, given the reasoning of the Multiverse Response, 
we should expect God to make a universe likes ours e.g. one containing the evils 
we see. Not only are the evils we observe explicable, but they are an expected 
result of any omnibenevolent deity’s creative scheme.  
 
1 One referee pointed out that Kraay is explicitly concerned with the problem of no best world. 
But Kraay—rightly, in my eyes—considers that problem to be a specific variation of the problem 
of evil (Kraay 2010b).  
2 Alternative views are available. Perhaps spacetime is infinitely big but mainly devoid of 
matter; ‘universes’ would then be the intermittent, denser, populated regions (Tegmark 2003). 
Perhaps spacetime branches and ‘universes’ are complete branches of spacetime (Saunders and 
Wallace 2008, 299). Perhaps, when a universe ends, it collapses before expanding back into a new 
‘universe’ (Steinhardt and Turok 2002). Perhaps our n–dimensional universe is merely one slice 
of an m>n–dimensional spacetime (Hudson 2008). With little exception (Monton 2010, 6–8), it 
makes little difference if you opt for an alternative. 




The Multiverse Response doesn’t say God makes every possible universe.3 For 
instance, a hellish universe wherein every agent suffers terribly, being unjustly 
tortured for eternity, is a possible universe, but presumably one that God would 
not make. Some axiological standard must be met by a universe in order for God 
to create it. Some have suggested:  
 
BEST ON BALANCE: God creates a universe iff that universe contains more 
good than evil. (McHarry 1978, 133; Turner 2003, 157) 
 
But BEST ON BALANCE has problems. Problem one: It allows an all–loving God to 
create people living lives of unremitting suffering just as long as this is 
countervailed by some other person being better off. Problem two: It’s arbitrary. 
There’s nothing ethically or metaphysically special about universe–sized 
spacetime regions versus any other region, so it’s odd for an axiological criterion 
like BEST ON BALANCE to make them its focus (cf Climenhaga 2018, 373). For 
instance, BEST ON BALANCE demands that God doesn’t make a spacetime 
consisting only of a horrendous evil, but it permits God to embed that evil in a 
spacetime just as long as, trillions of light years away, there is enough sentient 
life enjoying itself to outweigh that evil. It seems bizarre to me that ‘embedding’ 
the evil in a larger region of spacetime makes any difference to the permissibility 
of allowing it to occur.  
This in mind, many alternative axiological principles have been mooted 
(Kraay 2013, 238–39; Monton 2010, 4–5; Ruhmkorff 2019, 302; Turner 2015, 123). 
The best such alternative is:  
 
PATIENT–CENTERED CRITERION: God makes a universe iff for every agent in 
that universe, the life of that agent is worth living (i.e. the agent’s own life 
has more good in it than evil).4 
 
PATIENT–CENTERED CRITERION does better than BEST ON BALANCE. It clearly 
solves the first problem for now, by definition, no agent suffers horribly without 
some countervailing good to their own life. And it doesn’t run into the second 
problem because it’s natural to make agents the focus of value judgements.  
Those who accept the Multiverse Response must claim that God will create 
our universe given the selected axiological criterion. In the case of PATIENT–
 
3 Thus this theory is distinct from genuine modal realism’s claim that there exist infinitely 
many disconnected spacetimes, one for every metaphysical possibility (Lewis 1986; see also 
Almeida 2008, 2017; Effingham 2016).  
4 With an eye on free will and divine punishment, you might tweak PATIENT–CENTERED 






CENTERED CRITERION, one might worry that at least one agent has a life not worth 
living. But even though there may be many actual examples of people living 
horrific lives and then dying, it’s dialectically appropriate to assume that every 
agent receives an infinitely rewarding eternal afterlife. No matter what evils have 
befallen some actually existing person, after a billion years of post–mortem bliss, 
it’s hard to believe they’d be better off not having existed. So, presumably, our 
universe would meet the demands of PATIENT–CENTERED CRITERION.  
(I admit both that I’m being slightly glib and that more could be said on this 
matter. But, for the purpose of this paper, I want to set aside these axiological 
worries and focus instead on the Duplication Objection (q.v.). So assume that our 
universe (and, later, our world) meets the required axiological standard.) 
 
2. The Duplication Objection 
 
The Multiverse Response’s big problem is the ‘Duplication Objection’:5 Why, 
when God makes 𝕌P-, does God make it imperfect? Why not simply duplicate 𝕌P? 
Similarly for every other universe: Won’t God always find it preferential to 
produce more perfection than create imperfect variety? (Monton 2010, 12–19). 
Consider the problem in more detail. Imagine 𝕌P contains a quadrillion agents, 
τ1, τ2… τ1×1015. Every agent has a perfect life. A bad way of thinking about 𝕌P- is 
that it’s identical to 𝕌P except that one of the agents, e.g. τ8, leads a slightly 
imperfect life. This is a bad way of thinking because, were God to create 𝕌P- in 
addition to 𝕌P, the agents in 𝕌P- would be distinct from those in 𝕌P; except for τ8, 
the agents at 𝕌P- would be qualitatively identical to the agents at 𝕌P, but that 
doesn’t make them numerically identical (Kraay 2010a, 360). 𝕌P- instead contains 
different agents, τ1×1015+1, τ1×1015+2… τ2×1015 (of which one of them, τ8+1×1015, has a cold). 
Now the problem is clearer: What purpose could be served by giving τ8+1×1015 a 
cold? What would motivate God to do that when it was avoidable? 
The literature has three counter–objections to the Duplication Objection. None 
work.  
 
2.1. The Impossibility Counter–objection 
 
The Impossibility Counter–objection says that the Duplication Objection doesn’t 
work because it’s metaphysically impossible for God to make duplicates of 𝕌P 
(Kraay 2010a, 360n22; McHarry 1978, 133, Megill 2011, 135; Turner 2003; 150). 
 
5 It isn’t the only problem (see, e.g., Johnson (2014) and Rubio (Forthcoming)). But for the 
purposes of this paper, it is the problem I focus on. 




Thus, if God wants to make another universe, it’ll have to be an imperfect 
universe like 𝕌P-. The reason to think that it’s impossible to make duplicates is 
because the Identity of Indiscernibles is true i.e. qualitative duplicates are 
numerically identical. (Indeed, if the Identity of Indiscernibles is true, then every 
agent in 𝕌P- and 𝕌P will have to differ, at least in some way.) 
But I, like most other philosophers, think the Identity of Indiscernibles is false 
(Black 1952). Other discussants of the Multiverse Response have raised the same 
concern (Draper 2004, 320; Monton 2010, 13–15). If the Multiverse Response did 
rely on the Identity of Indiscernibles then the Multiverse Response would be 
relegated to being a curiosity that only professional philosophers would spend 
time considering. It’d hardly make for an impressive response to the problem of 
evil.  
 
2.2. The Variation Counter–objection 
 
The Variation Counter–objection says that there’s value in there being a variety 
of differing things. A reality consisting of nothing but duplicates of perfection is 
not as valuable as a reality consisting of a myriad of much more varied things, 
even when that variety comes hand–in–hand with imperfection (Parfit 1992; 
Turner 2003, 147).  
There’s at least some merit in this response. Imagine I adore M&Ms. I would 
nevertheless tire of eating nothing but M&Ms. Solely in terms of gastronomic 
value, there is a reason to eat other things even when I consider them less tasty 
than M&Ms. Chowing down on a good lentil burger, I can simultaneously 
acknowledge that M&Ms are superior but that my (less–than–perfect) burger 
plays a value–adding role (e.g. helping me appreciate the M&Ms when I have 
them). Similarly, τ8+1×1015 having a cold could be permissible and value–adding in 
virtue of the variety it adds to what would otherwise be a duplicate of 𝕌P. 
Ultimately, though, this response strains credulity. Firstly, when we get to the 
many massacres and horrors that we find in our own history, it’s absurd to think 
that they have been included merely to ‘liven reality up a little’. A lentil burger 
adds variety to my diet and its variation is value–adding, but if you force me to 
eat a platter of brambles or drink a glass of caustic battery acid, I wouldn’t feel 
the same. We can get value–adding variety without going to such extremes. 
Similarly, it seems absurd that famines and plagues are added for the sake of 
variety.  
Secondly, the thing which is imperfect may not be the thing which gains value. 
The event of me eating the lentil burger is imperfect, but it’s my life overall which 
gains the value. Similarly, the Variation Counter–objection requires people to 





same reason that we prefer PATIENT–CENTERED CRITERION to BEST ON BALANCE, 
this seems repugnant. That God would permit harm to befall agents solely to 
improve the value of some non–sentient thing (namely, the collection of all 
universes which compose all of reality) seems obviously immoral. Compare: The 
Nazi bombing of Guernica resulted in much misery and suffering and it’d be 
obviously immoral to allow it to happen solely because it results in the 
production of an inanimate object––Picasso’s ‘Guernica’––which is of significant 
value.  
In response, one may argue that the variety of pains across the agent’s life does 
add to the agent’s own life (as well as adding to the value of reality as a whole). 
But were the value of the variety you get from the evil in your life enough to 
outweigh the evils themselves, then we need never mention multiple universes 
to explain away the problem of evil in the first place. So this attempt to salvage 
the Variety Counter–objection would undermine the Multiverse Response.  
 
2.3. The Vastness Counter–objection 
 
If you have so many things that it’s impossible to have any more of those things, 
say that those things are ‘vast in number’. Merely being infinite is not enough to 
be vast for it’s standard to believe that you can add to an infinite number of things 
e.g. whilst there are an infinite number of odd numbers, you can still add more 
numbers to them for they are but a subset of all the numbers. So vastness is a 
‘step above’ infinity. (In the literature, we find talk of ‘proper class many’ things; 
that’s the sort of idea ‘vastness’ is meant to capture.) 
It’s debatable whether any things can be vast in number, but let’s assume that 
they can. The Vastness Counter–objection says that God does make duplicates of 
𝕌P; indeed, God makes as many duplicates of perfection as He can i.e. makes a 
vast number of duplicates of 𝕌P. By definition, He can then make no more such 
duplicates. But He can still make more universes by making universes which 
aren’t duplicates of the perfect universe e.g. by making 𝕌P-. Following through 
the reasoning of §2, God ends up making our own universe. (Turner (2015, 114–
5) discusses this counter–objection; see also Johnson (2014, 459–61) and a related 
discussion by Monton (2010, 15–16)). 
Even if some Fs could be vast, this won’t help—at least, not if the way vastness 
works is at all similar to how other cardinalities function. In the case of other 
cardinalities, if there are a certain cardinality of Gs which are F then there are (at 
least) that many Gs. For instance, if you have seven apples then you have at least 
seven pieces of fruit and if you have beth–7 apples, then you have at least beth–
7 pieces of fruit. In lieu of a formal theory of vastness, I assume vastness will 
work much the same. If you have a vast number of apples then you have a vast 




number of pieces of fruit. But if you have a vast number of pieces of fruit, then 
not only can you make no more apples but you can make no more bananas or 
pears. Similarly, if God made a vast number of perfect universes then God has 
made a vast number of universes. And, having made a vast number of universes, 
God would be unable to go on to make an imperfect universe like 𝕌P- or our own. 
Those supporting the Vastness Counter–objection must therefore provide a 
theory of vastness that avoids ‘vast’ acting anything like a normal cardinality in 
this regard; since that’s absent, we should press on.  
 
3. The Multiactualities Response 
 
3.1. Worlds instead of universes 
 
This paper argues for a new response to the problem of evil, similar to the 
Multiverse Response, which better avoids the Duplication Objection. I call it the 
‘Multiactualities Response’. To understand it, we need to clearly distinguish 
between ‘universes’ and ‘worlds’. By ‘universe’ I mean some maximally 
disconnected spacetime (or something along those lines, see n1). By ‘world’ I 
mean a possible world, as they are standardly understood by modal 
metaphysicians/logicians. Where universes are concrete spatiotemporal regions, 
worlds are standardly taken to be some sort of abstract object (e.g. a proposition, 
or state of affair, or—as I suggest below for the toy theory I introduce for 
exposition purposes—a fusion of abstract possibilia).6 The Multiverse Response 
says that there are multiple universes. The Multiactualities Response instead says 
that there are multiple actual worlds (note the focus on actual worlds—it’s 
uncontroversial that there are multiple worlds, but far more controversial that 
there are multiple actual worlds!). This section describes the Multiactualities 
Response. The rest of the paper defends it against the charge of unintelligibility 
on the grounds that it makes no sense to talk about ‘multiple actualities’, 
‘multiple actual worlds’ etc.  
The basic idea of the theory is as follows. God knows what possibilities there 
are and, being omnipotent, it’s within His power to make some possibility actual; 
we can say that God ‘actualises’ the corresponding possible world. For instance, 
if God brings into being an arrangement of matter across spacetime such that I 
win the lottery, then we would say that God actualises a world at which I win 
the lottery. The controversial claim of this paper is that God can actualise multiple 
 
6 Famously, Lewis (1986) argues that worlds are disconnected spacetimes. Set aside this 
‘genuine modal realist’ view. Genuine modal realists have their own responses to the problem of 
evil (Almeida 2008, 2017; Effingham 2016) and so probably won’t be interested in the argument 





worlds i.e. that there can be multiple actual worlds. If that controversial claim is 
true, God should actualise every world which meets the appropriate axiological 
criterion (i.e. of every agent at it having a life worth living). All other worlds 
remain unactualised. Since we live in a world which (allegedly) meets the 
axiological criterion, God actualises our world. We again have an explanation for 
why we see the evils around us.  
Return to the Duplication Objection and see why the Multiactualities Response 
fares better. With universes, God creates two of them, a perfect one and a near–
perfect one. The problem is then why God didn’t instead just make two 
indiscernible perfect universes? But similar thinking doesn’t apply to multiple 
actual worlds. It’s natural to believe that worlds, actual or otherwise, are 
individuated by what’s true of them, i.e.: 
 
WORLD INDIVIDUATION: World w1 and world w2 are the same world  for 
every proposition :  is true at w1   is true at w2.  
 
WORLD INDIVIDUATION entails that there cannot be two indiscernible worlds. 
If God actualised both a perfect world and a slightly blemished near–perfect 
world, He can’t make the latter perfect without having merely actualised just one 
world. That is: If God tried to make a near–perfect universe otherwise perfect, He 
would succeed, but if God tried to make a near–perfect world otherwise perfect, 
He would instead have actualised a different world.  
One may doubt WORLD INDIVIDUATION. But it’s eminently plausible. Firstly: 
It’s intuitive. If, in chess, you are told there are three ways to win a match, you’d 
be confused if those ‘three ways’ consisted of precisely the same set of moves. 
Similarly, if possible worlds are ‘ways the world can be’, it’s bizarre for there to 
be distinct worlds of which everything true of them is the same. Secondly: WORLD 
INDIVIDUATION drops out of many ersatz theories of possible worlds. It obviously 
drops out of an identification of worlds with sets of propositions. Other ersatz 
theories will likewise entail it (e.g. a combinatorial theory) or will do so when 
supplemented with some reasonable assumptions (e.g., assuming properties are 
individuated by their causal and nomological roles, it follows from the 
identification of worlds with universals).  
Therefore, whilst God may be able to create duplicate universes, He can’t 
actualise duplicate worlds.  
 
3.2. Modal Metaphysics 
 
Having introduced worlds, it’s perspicuous to introduce a metaphysical system 
for discussing such worlds. My chosen system comprises two claims. 




First claim: At every world an object exists at, it has a modal part at that world 
(Graham 2015; Wallace 2014). ‘Modal part’ is defined thus: 
 
x is a modal part of y at w =df (i) x exists at, and only at, w; and (ii) for every 
z, z overlaps a part of y at w  z overlaps a part of x at w.  
We then add:  
 
x is F at w  x’s modal part at w is F.7 
 
E.g., since it’s possible for me to be a fisherman, or a cyborg, or married, I have 
modal parts which are fisherman, cyborg, and married.  
Second claim: Modal parts that don’t exist at a world which is actual are 
abstract, not concrete. That is, rather than being a Lewisean (whereby possible 
worlds and their contents are concrete physical things), I’ll assume a 
‘Williamsonian’ ontology (whereby things which aren’t actualised are abstract). 
So, for instance, my modal part which is a cyborg exists, but it is an abstract 
object. Similarly, my non–actual sister is composed solely of abstract modal parts 
(and thus is, herself, an abstract object).  
These modal parts have intrinsic properties and stand in relations to one 
another. Being abstract, though, it’s not as if they’re married, or a cyborg, or a 
fisherman (for only concrete things can get married, have bionics, or go fishing). 
Instead, modal parts have ersatz properties and stand in ersatz relations 
corresponding to those properties/relations. Use a subscripted  to mark out those 
properties/relations. Some of my modal parts are thus married, a cyborg, a 
fisherman etc. Indeed, my actual modal part also has these ersatz properties, for 
instance it’s a philosopher. Being actual, it’s also a philosopher. That in mind, 
say:  
 
PROPERTIES/PROPERTIES: x ( ( x is a modal part  x is actual  Fx )  Fx ) 
 
Finally, given these two claims, it’s then natural to say that worlds are 
composed of modal parts i.e. a world w is identical to those modal parts which 
exist at w. (Note that, just as other ersatz theories of worlds fail to analyse 
modality, this system will also fail to analyse modality, since it’ll be a brute fact 





7 In the terminology I introduce below, that equates to saying: x is F at w  the modal part of 





3.3. Problem: The Axiological Status of Multiple Actualities 
 
That metaphysical system in place, we can more easily understand the problems 
facing the Multiactualities Response. The big problem is how to make sense of 
their being multiple actual worlds. But, before we turn to that, consider the 
following: Why would God bother to actualise multiple worlds? With the 
Multiverse Response, this was less of a problem. Clearly God should make more 
universes, we might think, because you end up with more agents––that is, agents 
numerically distinct from one another––leading valuable lives. But, given the 
Multiactualities Response, the agents are (transworld) identical and things aren’t 
as clear–cut. In short: If God actualises a world where we all have perfect lives, 
what reason would God have for actualising another world where we also have 
less well–off lives?  
But God does have a reason. Compare it to a temporal case. Imagine I have an 
excellent life for fifty years. I am then faced with a choice: (i) die and cease to be; 
(ii) live on, but with a less–than–excellent life (although a life which is still worth 
living). Clearly, I should rationally opt for (ii). It’s prima facie good for there to be 
more temporal parts of me, even when those temporal parts are having a less–
than–great time than some other temporal parts of me. More temporal parts is 
ceteris paribus more valuable. 
Similarly, even though God has made modal parts of me which are 
experiencing perfect lives, that doesn’t mean that my having more modal parts 
isn’t better. And that applies even when those modal parts aren’t as well off as 
some perfect modal parts. I should be glad that God brought my actually existing 
modal parts into being; that there are other modal parts of me having a much 
better time is by–the–by. 
 
3.4. Problem: The Intelligibility of Multiple Actualities 
 
The Multiverse Response requires multiple universes. That it’s possible for there 
to be multiple universes is readily accepted. But that there could be multiple 
actual worlds should initially strike you as unintelligible. This, more serious, 
problem is the focus of the remainder of this paper. There are two ways of 
understanding this problem.  
The first way is an incredulous stare. Once one understands what it is for a 
world to be actual, you might think it’s simply impossible to conceive of multiple 
worlds being actual.  
The second way pads out that incredulity with arguments. Argument one: If 
God makes one world actual, were He to try to make another world actual, then 
what He’d end up instead doing is make one enormous actual world consisting 
of disconnected island universes. Argument two: Imagine P is true at one world 




and false at another. God actualises both worlds, thus (where ‘A’ is the 
‘Actually…’ operator), APA¬P is true. If we assume either of: 
  
FACTIVITY OF ACTUALITY: A   
 COMMUTATIVITY OF ¬/A: A¬  ¬A 
 
Then we get a contradiction i.e. P¬P in the first case and AP¬AP in the second.  
 
4. Multiple Nows 
 
Let’s start with the incredulous stare. Assume the standardly held position that 
there’s a strong analogy between time and modality—specifically, between ‘the 
present’ and ‘the actual world’. The argument of this section is that, since there 
are already views which allow for there to be multiple nows, the idea of there 
being multiple actualities isn’t absurd.  
Dowe (2009) considers worlds where (i) tensed theory is true (i.e. the present 
moment is in some sense ‘metaphysically privileged’) and (ii) time loops back on 
itself (for more on ‘looping time’ see (Effingham 2020, 17–19). For purpose of 
example, we’ll see how this works with a flatland universe consisting of two 
spatial dimensions such that the universe is a spatial circle. Extending it in the 
temporal direction, the shape of the spacetime depends upon whether time is 
linear or whether it loops. If linear, it’d form a cylinder. If it loops, it forms a torus. 
Given tensed theory, at different times, different vertical slices of the 
cylinder/torus would be metaphysically privileged. In the case of the toroidal 
‘looping’ spacetime, the metaphysically privileged present moment keeps 
looping around, repeatedly illuminating the same segments of the spacetime. See 
figure 1. There can also be cases where only a part of the spacetime forms a 
temporal loop, for instance if there were wormholes which connect the present 






Dowe develops different models of tensed time for understanding these 
spacetimes. One of the models has it that the segment of spacetime which is 
metaphysically privileged ‘splits off’ when it reaches the wormhole (Dowe 2009, 
660–61). The portion which has split off ultimately arrives back in the past, at 
which point a region of spacetime that was once present is now present again, as 
well as what we’d call ‘the present moment’ back in the future (see figure 3). 
Wormholes are ‘now–duplicators’ (Dowe 2009, 663).8 
That model bears out exactly what I need i.e. a case of multiple present 
moments. Were I to knowingly travel through the wormhole to the past, when I 
arrive I should believe that not only do I enjoy the metaphysical privilege 
afforded to those people and things which are around me, but so too do those I 
left behind in the future. This is the kernel of my argument. Granting the 
coherency of this ‘Dowian theory’, we should grant the coherency of multiple 
nows. And if multiple nows are coherent then—since modality and temporality 
are analogous—we should grant the coherency of multiple actualities. Thus the 
Multiactualities Response to the Problem of Evil avoids the unintelligibility 
problem. And note that Dowe’s theory is not the only theory in this 
neighbourhood; there are other theories which accept the possibility of multiple 
presents. Spoalore and Torrengo (Forthcoming) argue that the moving spotlight 
theory can make room for ‘multiple nows’ and Goff (2010) similarly has a time 
travel theory which makes multiple moments ‘present’.  
The rest of this paper delves into the details of a metaphysical system bearing 
out multiple nows and multiple actualities, explaining how to avoid the 




8 Dowe considers the model inferior to a competing model. But he does not consider it absurd 
(2009, 663). That is, he considers it a plausible model.  




5. The Metaphysics of Multiple Nows 
 
5.1. Tensed Theories of Time  
 
To understand more about the metaphysics of the Multiactualities Response, I’ll 
start by developing the metaphysics of the temporal case (§6) before extending it 
to the modal case (§7). 
The Dowian theory makes clear why we might want to say multiple moments 
can be present, but doesn’t say much about the specific metaphysical details 
which would allow multiple moments to be present. Certainly, not every tensed 
theory can make room for multiple nows. For instance, orthodox growing block 
theory says: 
 
t is the present moment =df (i) t is concrete; and (ii) no other time is both 
concrete and later than t. 
 
That version of growing block theory has a metaphysics straightforwardly 
inconsistent with there being multiple nows. This section develops a tensed 
theory which instead allows for multiple nows.  
First of all, I’ll assume that there’s a grounding relation, which I’ll take to be a 
relation between facts (Bliss and Trogdon 2014). For example: facts about tables 
existing are grounded in facts about atoms being arranged in a certain way; facts 
about pieces of cheese having holes in them are grounded in facts about the 
arrangement of parts which compose the cheese; a Platonist might say that facts 
about some x being F is grounded in facts about x instantiating Fness. Derivative 
facts are those which are grounded; fundamental facts are those which are not 
grounded by any other facts. 
Grounding theorists tend towards a permissive ontology (Schaffer 2010a, 356–
62). Gerrymandered mereological sums, numbers, properties, propositions, 
possibilia, fictional objects etc. all exist in a permissive ontology. What’s at stake, 
metaphysically speaking, is not whether they exist, but what facts explain their 
existence i.e. what explains the relevant ‘existential facts’. If we assume a 
permissive ontology then past/future objects exist (just like everything else 
exists). E.g. Rose the T–Rex exists even though she died 66 million years ago. 
Further, if we assume ontology is permissive, some form of perdurantism is true 
and things have temporal parts. E.g. r, being an instantaneous temporal part of 
Rose, did exist—thus, given permissivism, also exists simpliciter. This doesn’t 
mean eternalism is true, however. Eternalists would further add that Rose, and 
r, are concrete; even if our ontology is permissive, we needn’t add that these 
things are concrete, instead taking past/future things (like Rose and r) to be 





endorse a Williamsonian ontology whereby things eternally exist, but are 
intermittently concrete.  
Next, consider the properties of the Williamsonian existents and the relations 
between them. In eternalist ontologies, this is straightforward e.g. r would be five 
metres tall, weigh eight tonnes, and stand in the ‘66 million years earlier’ relation 
to my current temporal part. But I’ve denied eternalism. Instead, r is abstract and 
currently unlocated in spacetime, so r can’t be any metres tall, nor have any 
weight, nor be earlier or later than anything. Instead r has ‘ersatz’ 
properties/relations. Using the subscript  to denote such properties/relations, r 
is five metres tall, weighs eight tonnes, and is 66 million years earlier than my 
current temporal part. In the case of r, and all instantaneous temporal parts in 
general, the ersatz properties correspond to the properties they would have were 
they present, from which it follows that: 
 
PROPERTIES/PROPERTIES: x ( ( x is an instantaneous temporal part  x is 
present  Fx)  Fx ) 
 
All this in place, move to detailing which facts are fundamental. I will assume 
there are two types of fact: tenseless facts and tensed facts.  
The first type, tenseless facts, never change. Hewing to the standard position 
that mereologically simple things are meant to be more fundamental than 
composite things, the fundamental tenseless facts will be a set of existential facts 
about the existence of mereologically simple (i.e. spatially and temporally simple 
things), the properties of those things, and the relations between them.9 The 
fundamental tenseless facts then ground all of the existential facts and facts 
concerning the properties/relations of everything. For instance, fundamental 
tenseless facts ground the existential facts concerning the existence of Rose, r, 
outposts on Mars, myself, yourself etc. They also ground that r is a dinosaur, is 
66 million years earlier than my current temporal part etc.  
 
9 A referee worried about the possibility of gunk. When faced with worries about 
fundamentality and gunk, the standard response is priority monism (Schaffer 2010b). More 
specifically, since time is tensed, we should endorse a version of Baron’s ‘priority presentism’ 
(Baron 2015) whereby the entire present moment is fundamental, grounding all other facts 
(whether they’re present facts or past/future facts). Were priority presentism true, we could allow 
for gunk by substituting all talk about fundamental facts about simples with talk about 
fundamental facts about the fusion of everything which presently exists. For instance, when we 
come to ‘double bubble theory’ (q.v.) we’d instead say that there are multiple fundamental facts 
about there being multiple presently existing universal wholes. 
One last note: Priority presentism assumes there are instants. Given gunk exists, you might 
fear instants don’t exist and instead that every interval has a sub–interval. But, given the dialectic, 
that’s not an open option because tensed time requires some instant to be metaphysically 
privileged, thus ‘temporal gunk’ is ruled out; if there is gunk, it must be merely spatial. 




The second type of fundamental fact will be tensed and will change over time. 
They are ‘concretizing facts’, saying of the mereologically simple things that they 
are concrete. Those facts thereby ground the concreteness of all presently existing 
things (i.e. you, me, everyone we know, our temporal parts etc.) in addition to 
the mereological simples. We can then reduce presentness to concreteness i.e. to 
be present is for you to be concrete in virtue of these fundamental tensed facts.  
Call this theory the single bubble theory of time because presently existing things 
form a concrete ‘bubble’ within the foam of merely abstract, non–present things. 
Being a moving spotlight theory cum presentist theory, it seems just as plausible 
as its tensed competitors (indeed Orilia (2016) already argues for a theory similar 
to that presented here). It seems obvious to me that those philosophers attracted 
to both permissiveness about ontology and presentism will find this the most 
natural ontology to endorse.  
Single bubble theory has but one present. It is not hard to add in another. 
Consider the plurality of concretizing facts which the single bubble theorist says 
makes concrete those things which are present (i.e., right now at least, those 
things in 2020 AD). Call that plurality of facts ‘C2020’. Now imagine that there’s a 
second collection of concretizing facts, in virtue of which Rose and r (and all the 
things from 66 million BC) are concrete. Call that plurality of facts ‘C66m’. There 
are correspondingly two collections of concreta: those inhabiting 2020 and those 
inhabiting 66 million BC. There are no multiple bubbles of concrete things and 
multiple present moments. Call that the double bubble theory of time.  
 
5.2. The First Problem for Multiple Nows 
 
With this system in place, consider temporal analogues of the problems from §4.4 
This section explains how double bubble theory resolves them.  
The temporal analogue of the first problem would be that, rather than there 
being two presents, there’s only a single, larger, present. But consider r, the 
temporal part of Rose, and n, my current instantaneous temporal part. There is a 
relation between r and n, namely that they’re separated by 66 million years. 
Were there to be two bubbles of presentness such that r and n were both present, 
it follows (given PROPERTIES/PROPERTIES) that they’re separated by 66 million 
years. Similarly for the times they exist at, call them tr and tn. Both tr and tn are 
separated by 66 million years; when they’re both present, they’re therefore 
separated by 66 million years. Since those times are temporally separated, they 
cannot be the same time! The first problem is solved.  
Here’s a possible complaint. I’ve stipulated of my system that two things are 
true: (i) there are ‘ersatz relations’, e.g. ‘__ is 66 million years earlier than __’; (ii) 
that PROPERTIES/PROPERTIES is true and instantaneous temporal parts which are 





stipulate that PROPERTIES/PROPERTIES is true. Whilst we might agree that, when 
tr was present the first time, tr was 66 million years earlier than tn, when I say it 
becomes present again the accusation would be that it’s instead simultaneous with 
tn (even though it’s still 66 million years earlier than tn i.e. even though it still 
stands in the relevant ersatz relation to me). That is, whilst I claim that 
PROPERTIES/PROPERTIES is true, my imaginary objector would say I’m simply 
wrong—indeed, the possibility of multiple concretizing facts like C66m and C2020 
would itself be taken to be a counterexample to the principle. But as far as I can 
see, the only reason to say this would be a dogged commitment to concreta 
having to be co–present with other concreta. And other tensed theorists already 
deny exactly that. For instance, moving spotlight theory says there are concrete 
things which aren’t co–present, as does growing block theory. Double bubble 
theory would be in the same vein, sharing that feature. Thus, double bubble 
theory is at least as plausible as moving spotlight theory/growing block theory—
which is to say, very plausible indeed.10  
 
5.3. The Second Problem for Multiple Nows I 
 
The temporal analogue of the second problem from §4.4 is as follows. Let Q be 
some proposition true in 2020 and false 66 million years ago. Where N is the ‘It is 
now the case…’ operator, NQ is true. Were I to time travel back to 66 million BC, 
making both times present, then NQN¬Q would be true. Given either of the 
following principles, we get a contradiction: 
 
 FACTIVITY OF PRESENTNESS: N    
 COMMUTATIVITY OF ¬/N: N¬  ¬N 
 
To solve this problem, double bubble theorists should co–opt some of the 
tenseless theorist’s machinery. Tenseless theorists relativise the truth of tensed 
sentences to times. ‘Rose the T–Rex currently weighs eight tonnes’ isn’t true 
simpliciter, rather it’s true relative to some Cretaceous time. The double bubble 
theorist should follow suit (cf Dowe 2009, 663). Given there are multiple nows, 
it’s only natural to relativise present truths to the ‘now’ to which they belong. Q 
isn’t simply true, it’s true relative to some present moment.  
The accusation will be one of heresy. Was not the whole point of tensed theory 
to avoid relativising truth to times like this (cf Dowe 2009, 663)? To defend against 
this charge, we should first clarify what is driving these worries about tenseless 
 
10 Of course, unlike moving spotlight theory, double bubble theory denies that all non–present 
things are concrete. But it should be of no surprise that the new tensed theory I’m developing 
disagrees with some claims of moving spotlight theory—it is, after all, a new theory. 




theory. Having done that, I can show that double bubble theory is nevertheless 
in–step with the motivations underlying tensed theory.11 Consider three possible 
drives for worrying about such relativisation. 
First drive: We may worry that the tenseless theorist’s relativisation of truth 
results in a theory which fails to allow reality to change. But double bubble theory 
is innocent of such heresy! Even were the truth of propositions relativised to the 
present moment, those truths nevertheless change in the fundamental way 
demanded by the tensed theorist. Right now, C2020 and C66m exist. But in a few 
moments time, these facts will change (and, say, C2020+ and C66m+ will exist, where 
those facts respectively make concrete one time slightly later in 66 million BC 
and another time slightly later in 2020 AD). 
Second drive: We may worry that tenseless theory’s relativisation of truth to a 
time leaves no room for people being in pain simpliciter (or being 6’ tall simpliciter, 
or being a philosopher simpliciter etc.). Clearly the tenseless theorist can’t allow 
this because, e.g., were I in pain simpliciter given tenseless theory, I would 
tenselessly be in pain (i.e. be in pain at every time), which is nonsense. But the 
double bubble theorist has none of these worries, even though they relativise 
truth to a time. The double bubble theorist admits that I can be in pain simpliciter. 
That fact holds jointly in virtue of (i) the tenseless fact that my instantaneous 
temporal part, n, is in pain and (ii) the tensed fact that n is concrete. In that it 
holds partially in virtue of a tensed fact, the fact that I am in pain simpliciter is 
 
11 Those puritanical about avoiding the machinery of the tenseless theorist could instead co–
opt fragmentalist thinking. Fine (2005) discusses alternatives to standard tensed theory. Let «» 
be the name of ‘the fact that ’. The standard realist about tense argues that the tensed facts which 
constitute reality change over time e.g. «Nikk Effingham is sitting» partially constitutes reality at 
the moment, but later «Nikk Effingham is standing» partially constitutes it. Fragmentalists 
(Hofweber and Lange 2017; Iaqunito 2019; Lipman 2015, 2016, 2018; Simon 2018; Torrengo and 
Iaqunito 2019) deny that facts change—«Nikk Effingham is sitting» and Nikk Effingham is 
standing» are both constituents of reality. Fragmentalists learn to live with this apparent 
incoherence by saying that different collections of facts form ‘fragments’ which make up reality. 
No fragment is more privileged than any other and, within each fragment, the facts ‘co–obtain’ 
and are mutually coherent.  
We could install a fragmentalist–style solution, rather than a tenseless–style ‘relativisation 
solution’, into double bubble theory. The theory in the main text would have it that facts like « 
Nikk Effingham is sitting relative to present moment t2020» and «Rose is eating relative to present 
moment t66m» constitute reality; those facts then change over time, just as in standard tense theory. 
The fragmentalist–style theory instead has it that reality is constituted by regular tensed facts (i.e. 
of the form « Nikk Effingham is standing» and «Rose is eating») which also change over time. 
And some of those tensed facts co–obtain, forming different fragments of reality. Unlike the 
normal fragmentalist theory, only some times—namely those which are present!—correspond to 
such fragments. (And just as fragmentalism has been extended to modality (Iaquinto 






likewise a tensed fact. So the double bubble theorist has room for my being in 
pain simpliciter without having to allow that I am in pain at every time. So if you 
are driven to deny the tenseless theorist’s relativisation of truth to a time on these 
grounds, they are not a reason to disallow the double bubble theorist doing 
likewise.  
Third drive: We may worry that the relativisation of truth fails to appropriately 
connect what’s presently true to what’s true simpliciter. Presentists, for instance, 
say that Nikk is in pain iff Nikk is in pain simpliciter. That’s a bi–conditional which 
the tenseless theorist must deny. Indeed, FACTIVITY OF PRESENTNESS is just the 
left–to–right reading of that bi–conditional and this third drive presumably 
amount to a commitment to FACTIVITY OF PRESENTNESS. 
The double bubble theorist cannot accept FACTIVITY OF PRESENTNESS. First, note 
that they can’t accept it because they deny that there’s an N operator, having 
ditched it for a temporally–relativised operator, Nt. But they can’t even accept an 
analogue of FACTIVITY OF PRESENTNESS which replaces the N operator with the Nt 
operator, i.e. they can’t accept: 
 
 RELATIVISED FACTIVITY: For any time t, Ntφ  φ. 
 
Double bubble theorists should say RELATIVISED FACTIVITY is false. Consider: 
There are no dinosaurs in 2020.12 2020 is present, thus presently (relative to 2020 
AD) there are no dinosaurs. Given RELATIVISED FACTIVITY there are no dinosaurs. 
However, there are dinosaurs in 66 million BC. 66 million BC is also present, thus 
presently (relative to 66 million BC) there are dinosaurs. Given RELATIVISED 
FACTIVITY there are dinosaurs. Hence there both are and are not dinosaurs—a 
contradiction! So the double bubble theorist cannot even accept an Nt- analogue 
of FACTIVITY OF PRESENTNESS. 
But this doesn’t mean that the double bubble theorist cannot accept a 
relationship between truth–at–a–time and truth simpliciter which is suitably 
similar to that which the presentist accepts. Start by considering what the double 
bubble theorist can accept. Demarcate propositions into two categories: positive 
propositions saying what is the case and negative propositions saying what is 
not the case. For instance, Nikk Effingham is in pain and Dinosaurs exist are 
positive propositions whilst ¬Rose is in pain and ¬Unicorns exist are negative 
propositions.13 Unlike the tenseless theorist, and like the presentist, the double 
bubble theorist can accept that a positive proposition is presently true iff it’s true 
simpliciter. Take a God’s eye view of reality looking at both bubbles which 
 
12 Rose still exists in 2020. But she’s no dinosaur, at best presently being a mere dinosaur. 
13 The division between negative and positive propositions is notoriously fraught. For reasons 
of space I will have to ignore those worries in this paper. 




presently exist. God sees, in one bubble, that I am presently in pain. Similarly, 
God sees that I am in pain simpliciter. Restricted just to positive propositions, God 
sees that there’s a connection between truth–at–a–time and truth simpliciter 
similar to the connection the presentist thinks there is (and which the tenseless 
theorist does not). What the double bubble theorist denies is that the same can be 
said of negative propositions. Return to the God’s eye view. God sees two 
bubbles, in one of which dinosaurs don’t presently exist i.e. N2020:¬Dinosaurs 
exist is true. But God can see that dinosaurs do exist simpliciter since Rose exists 
simpliciter in the other bubble, roaming around the other concrete ‘now’. So the 
connection clearly fails for negative propositions. In short, double bubble 
theorists should only accept:  
 
POSITIVE FACTIVITY: For any time t, and any positive proposition , Nt   
. 
 
POSITIVE FACTIVITY doesn’t cause the double bubble theorist problems in the 
way that RELATIVISED FACTIVITY and FACTIVITY OF PRESENTNESS do. And POSITIVE 
FACTIVITY does capture an intimate connection between what’s true at a time and 
what’s true simpliciter—certainly it captures a relationship in a way the presentist 
alleges the tenseless theorist is unable to do so. So whilst the double bubble 
theory relativises truth to a time, they can nevertheless accept—with the 
presentist—that there is an intimate connection between truth at a time and truth 
simpliciter.14  
 
5.4. The Second Problem for Multiple Nows II 
 
§6.3 explained why FACTIVITY OF PRESENTNESS is false. That just leaves 
COMMUTATIVITY OF ¬/N. The double bubble theorist denies that principle, since 
there’s no N operator. The double bubble analogue of COMMUTATIVITY OF ¬/N is: 
 
 COMMUTATIVITY OF ¬/Nt: Nt¬  ¬ Nt  
 
And that principle is unproblematic. Assume Q was true in 2020 and false in 
66 million BC. Only N2020QN66m¬Q follows from this and COMMUTATIVITY OF ¬/Nt 
will then entail no contradiction.  
 
14 One might think contradictions still lurk in the wings. Imagine I am 6’ tall and time travel 
from 2020 to 1985. In 1985, my younger self was 4’ tall. N2020: Nikk is 6’ tall and N1985: Nikk is 4’ 
tall are both true; both are positive propositions, thus (given RESTRICTED FACTIVITY) Nikk is 6’ 
tall  Nikk is 4’ tall is true. That looks contradictory. However, I don’t think this is a problem. I 





This finishes my exposition of a metaphysical system allowing for there to be 
multiple nows.  
 
6. The Metaphysics of Multiple Actualities 
 
6.1. Modal Bubble Theory 
 
Having developed a metaphysical system underpinning there being multiple 
nows, we can now port that over and develop a metaphysical system 
underpinning there being multiple actual worlds. Call it modal bubble theory. §4.2 
introduced three parts of this theory already: (i) everything is composed of modal 
parts (with ersatz properties); (ii) all possible things necessarily exist (and if 
they’re not actualised, they’re abstract); (iii) some fusions of modal parts are 
possible worlds.  
To this picture we now add in grounding relations. Mirroring double bubble 
theory’s focus on fundamental facts being about mereological simples, modal 
bubble theory can follow suit, saying that the fundamental facts are all about the 
existence and nature of modal parts of instantaneous temporal parts of spatial 
simples. These fundamental facts ground all facts about what exists, the 
properties of those things, and the relations between those things. (We should 
also add that there’ll be fundamental facts saying which fusions of those things 
count as being possible worlds; recall, I’m making no effort to analyse away 
modality.) 
Not only are there necessary fundamental facts, there are contingent 
fundamental facts (so the theory is ‘actualist’). Those contingent facts are 
concretizing facts saying which mereologically simple things are concrete. It is in 
virtue of these contingent facts that everything which is actual is concrete (or, if 
you further endorse temporal bubble theory: everything which is both actual and 
present is concrete). For instance, where w is the world we generally regard as 
the actual world, there’s a collection of fundamental concretizing facts, C, in 
virtue of which our world is concrete i.e. in virtue of which the mereological 
simples composing w are concrete. God can actualise multiple worlds by 
making extra contingent concretizing facts. For instance, further to C (in virtue 
of which w is concrete) God can make w and w actual by making two more 
collections of concretizing facts, C and C.15 
 
15 There’s another theory, patchwork theory, which is footnote worthy. Patchwork theory has it 
that God actualises only parts of worlds, without making concrete the entire world. In that case, 
many more things can be made concrete than otherwise. For instance, if there’s a world where I 
live a perfect life but some agents live lives not worth living, then the appropriate axiological 
principle (§2) prevents God making that world. But given patchwork theory, God concretises my 




6.2. Solving Problems 
 
This in place, we can now solve the problems, mooted in §4.4, facing multiple 
actualities. The solutions all mirror those from §6.3–6.5.  
The first worry is that God, in making C, C and C, is just making one really 
big actual world consisting of island universes. But modal bubble theory is an 
extension of the theory sketched in §4.2. That original sketch says that worlds are 
fusions of modal parts—exactly which fusions being a matter of brute fact. Modal 
bubble theory agrees with this and will likewise agree over which fusions of 
modal parts qualify as worlds. So both theories agree that there are some modal 
parts which compose w, some which compose w, some which compose w, and 
that it’s a brute fact that these fusions are worlds. Thus if C, C and C are all 
concretezing facts then there must be three different worlds. It’s just built into the 
theory!  
One might come down hard against this and say that if things are concrete 
then they must be co–actual. But there’s already a theory out there which denies 
just this, namely Lewis’s genuine modal realism (1986). In the same way that 
double bubble theory allied itself to moving spotlight theory’s commitment to 
the possibility of concreta being non–simulataneous, modal bubble theory allies 
itself to genuine modal realism’s commitment to the possibility of concreta failing 
to be co–actual.16  
The next problem was that a contradiction followed given: 
 
 FACTIVITY OF ACTUALITY: A   
 
Modal bubble theory has no actuality operator, A. Instead, there’s an actuality 
operator which relativises truth to a metaphysically privileged/concrete world. 
Represent that operator using ‘A ’. Rather than FACTIVITY OF ACTUALITY we 
should endorse the unproblematic: 
 
POSITIVE FACTIVITY OF ACTUALITY: For any metaphysically privileged 
world, , and any positive proposition , A  . 
 
 
modal parts at that world even though agents who suffer intolerable evils are left being merely 
non–concrete (and thus suffering no evils at all). This has the weird upshot that I might be having 
a conversation with someone who isn’t a concrete existent. That’s very weird—perhaps so weird 
that the theory is unbelieable. It’s nevertheless worth noting.  
16 And, in the same way that double bubble theory denied the moving spotlight theory’s 
commitment to all non–present things being concrete (see fn 9), the modal bubble theorist will 
deny the genuine modal realist’s commitment to all possibilia being concrete. Only some possibilia 





Similarly, there’s a problem given: 
 
 COMMUTATIVITY OF ¬/A: A¬  ¬A 
 
But the modal bubble theorist should instead endorse the unproblematic: 
  
COMMUTATIVITY OF ¬/A: A¬  ¬A 
 
Thus both problems are dissolved if we relativise actuality in this manner. And 
just as I see no problem with the tensed theorist relativising actuality to present 
moments, I see no problem with modal bubble theorists relativising actuality to 
concretized worlds.  
 
6.3. Back to the Duplication Objection 
 
All of this was in aide of developing a theory similar to the Multiverse Response 
which avoids the Duplication Objection. At the end of §4.1 I explained why 
multiple actual worlds avoid an analogue of the Duplication Objection: God can 
make duplicate universes but (given WORLD INDIVIDUATION) it makes no sense to 
allow for duplicate worlds. So if God wants more worlds than the perfect one—
and He should if He can actualise them!—then He has to actualise imperfect 
worlds.  
Further to that argument, having laid out the modal metaphysical system as I 
have, there are two other ways to make a similar point. This section lays them 
out. They complement, and do not replace, the thinking from §4.1.  
Given the modal metaphysical system, all parties—regardless of whether they 
believe God actualises one world or many—should agree that exactly the same 
worlds (and modal parts) exist. All parties to the debate should also agree which 
worlds are perfect. Given the Multiactualities Response, God actualises those 
perfect worlds (which, given modal bubble theory, amounts to making them 
concrete). God then sees that there are yet more worlds He could make concrete 
which (given §4.3) would make reality as a whole a better place. Thus God makes 
them concrete/actualises them as well. That means, assuming our world meets 
that axiological standard, God makes concrete our world. 
A complaint analogous to the Duplication Objection would be that when God 
actualises the world I live in, God should also have made my life better at this 
world. But the machinery of possible worlds and modal parts will help make 
clear why this problem goes away. To wonder why God didn’t make my life 
better is to wonder about a modal claim—it is to wonder about why God didn’t 
actualise a world at which my life is better. But God did actualise that world! He just 
also went on to actualise the world where my life’s not as good. (Note the 




difference to the Multiverse Response. Given the Multiverse Response, God 
merely concretizes a universe where someone like me has a better life. In this case, 
God concretizes me having that better life.) 
Here’s another way to put a similar idea. In §4.3 I argued that God should 
want to make actual as many modal parts of me as possible, just as long as they 
meet the relevant axiological standard. So God starts by actualising a world at 
which Nikk lives a perfect life. Having actualised that world, God then decides 
to also actualise the world we see around us. The reason God does this is not to 
bring Nikk into concrete existence since I am already a concrete existent at some 
other world where I live a perfect life. As §4.3 argued, the motivation for God to 
actualise this world is to actualise the ‘this–worldly modal part’ of Nikk. And, 
unlike me, my modal parts are worldbound entities which exist (by necessity!) at 
only one world. Thus my ‘this–worldly modal part’ is (by necessity!) such that it 
suffers evils. Hence, if God wants to actualise that modal part (which, as §4.3 
defended, He does) then He has to actualise an imperfect world along with it. 
Again, we can’t say similar things in the case of the Multiverse Response. Given 
the Multiverse Response, God makes more universes in order to create extra 
people rather than extra modal parts. And when God creates an extra person, it’s 
true of that person that their life could have been better, at which stage God is 
faced by the awkward question of why He didn’t make that person’s life better. 
Since, by necessity, God could not have made my ‘this–worldly modal part’ 
better off than it is, the same simply cannot be said of modal parts.  
The arguments in this section may appear to make the ontology of modal parts 
central. This is merely an appearance. Consider cases where philosophers talk 
about temporal parts when it’s easy and perspicuous to do so, without 
necessarily committing to perdurantism. It’s legitimate to do this because they 
can talk about temporal parts full in the knowledge that a workable endurantist 
theory should be able to translate any helpful temporal parts talk back into 
endurantist terms. For instance, an endurantist who doesn’t believe in temporal 
parts should nevertheless be able to accept the thrust of §4.3’s argument that it’s 
good for me to live a longer life even if my life is less perfect than it once was. 
Such endurantists would just cash the argument out in endurantist–friendly 
terms, rather than using temporal parts talk. Similarly, I’m using modal part talk 
as an expository device. Were you to endorse a rival theory to modal parts (e.g. 
counterpart theoretic accounts (Lewis 1968), anti–realist competitors (Rosen 
1990), etc.) then, assuming that the rival theory is worth its salt, you should be 
able to parse what I’ve said into your own terms without affecting the thrust of 










The Multiverse Response’s big problem is the Duplication Objection. We can 
overcome that Objection by recasting the Multiverse Response as a case of God 
actualising multiple possible worlds, rather than universes. The big problem for 
this new theory is that prima facie it makes no sense to talk of multiple actual 
worlds. But considerations in the philosophy of time travel lead us to believe 
there can be multiple nows; by analogy, there can be multiple actual worlds. Thus 
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